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Abstract
We critically reassess the notion that high liquid asset holding by firms
faced with weak investor protection is evidence of managerial rent extraction.
We show that firms facing agency problems may establish tight controls over
management through concentrated ownership. Using data on Belgian listed
firms between 1991 and 2006, we find a strong positive association between
ownership concentration and cash holding. This indicates a precautionary
motive on the part of the controlling shareholders who highly value control.
We also find that firm market valuation is positively affected by the amount
of cash held by firms. On the other hand, managerial ownership has no
impact. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms’ owners
are pursuing a rational strategy to mitigate agency costs in the face of weak
investor protections.
Keywords: Cash holding, ownership concentration; Investor protection;
Control-oriented finance; Family firms.
JEL Classification: G30; G32; G34
1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate the effect of ownership structure on cash
holdings and how the market values the cash held by firms.1 One prominent
∗Corresponding author. Tel: +44 (0) 207 955 620
Email addresses: r.w.anderson@lse.ac.uk (Ronald W. Anderson),
mh463@le.ac.uk (Malika Hamadi)
1We use the terms cash and liquid assets throughout the paper indifferently.
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view regarding the amounts of cash held by firms, in the tradition of Berle and
Means (1932), focuses on the possible conflict of interests between managers
and shareholders. Jensen (1986) argues that agency problems are particularly
severe in firms with substantial large free cash flows. Similarly, if as argued
by Myers and Rajan (1998) liquid assets are relatively easy to transform into
private benefits for managers, then we would expect that when governance
structures are weak managers will lead the firm to hold relatively high levels
of liquid assets.
A number of international cross-country studies have been interpreted as
lending support for the view that relatively high cash holdings are a symp-
tom of managerial rent extraction. For instance, Dittmar et al. (2003) find
that cash holding tends to be high in countries with relatively weak investor
protection. Kusnadi and Wei (2011) argue that legal protection of investors
results in lower levels of cash held by firms. Pinkowitz et al. (2006) find
that cash reserves are valued less in countries with weak investor protection
since controlling insiders in these countries have greater ability to extract
private benefits from cash holdings. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) make a di-
rect link between cash holdings and managerial ownership. First, they find
some evidence of a positive association between the fraction of shares held
by management and cash holdings. Second, they show that firm values are
lower when controlling managers hold more cash and external country-level
shareholder protection is weak. They interpret their results as evidence of
managerial agency problems when external shareholder protections are poor.
In this paper we critically reassess these findings and offer an alternative
explanation of the motives of cash holdings by studying Belgian listed firms.
The Belgian case is interesting because by common metrics the Belgian cor-
porate system is characterized by poor investor protection (e.g., La Porta
et al., 1998). At the same time Belgium has inherited a control-oriented fi-
nancial system. This features high levels of ownership concentration and a
continuing prominence of family firms, even several generations after their
foundation.2 This is facilitated in part by a well-developed system of voting
alliances which allows a greater voting power and in part by control devices
that makes it harder for hostile takeovers to take place (Becht and Ro¨ell,
1999). In this context, the role of the stock market to finance new invest-
ments is not as prominent as in market-oriented economies which enjoy liquid
2For some firms it is the fourth generation who is in charge.
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capital markets (Franks and Mayer, 1995). Instead, growth opportunities re-
quiring external finance are pursued principally through debt finance. This
use of leverage by owners with long investment horizons can create a strong
precautionary motive for cash holding. This tendency may be reinforced by
shareholder risk aversion if control is maintained only at the cost of under-
diversification. Goergen and Renneboog (2001) argue that in Belgium often
a large proportion of the controlling shareholders’ wealth is invested in the
firm with a long term commitment. As a consequence relatively high cash
holding may be a constrained optimal policy for such owners whose long-term
returns are threatened by the loss of control through distressed issuance of
outside equity or bankruptcy.
In this study we carefully construct a data set of Belgian listed firms from
1991 to 2006 which allows us to determine the degree to which control rights
are concentrated in blocks of shares and also whether a controlling ownership
block has family links to the firm’s founder. We find evidence to support the
hypothesis that relatively high levels of cash holding are a reflection of a
rational strategy by owners who seek value through long-term control. First,
we show that shareholding is very concentrated, but managerial sharehold-
ing tends to be very small compared to the controlling shareholders. In more
than 85% of the cases observed, no manager reports share ownership in the
firm.3 In contrast, on average the controlling shareholder block holds 54% of
shares. Second, shareholders concentrate control rights by joining in voting
alliances.4 Our data indicated that in almost one third of our observations
there is a voting alliance of shareholders who commit to act in unison. Con-
trolling shareholders in voting alliances hold on average 55% of the shares
against 53% for large controlling shareholders who are not part of any voting
alliance. Third, our data show that debt financing is very high in Belgian
listed firms. The median of the ratio of debt to assets is 36%, which is higher
than for any country reported by Rajan and Zingales (1995) in their inter-
national comparison of leverage in listed firms. Fourth, liquid asset holding
3The Belgian disclosure law of 1989 requires shareholders to notify the Banking Com-
mission when their shareholding reaches 5%. But many firms have statutes that require
notification of any holding that reaches a threshold of 3%.
4To the best of our knowledge no cross-country study on ownership and cash holdings
has considered voting alliances. This is probably due to the fact that data available from
the usual providers like Bureau Van Dijk report shareholders individually without making
any link between them through the voting blocks alliances.
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is positively associated with ownership concentration. On the other hand,
there is no significant effect of managerial ownership on the amount of cash
held by firms. A robustness test indicates that under-diversified controlling
shareholders are associated with more cash holdings.
Fifth, we find that the amount of cash held by firms is positively associ-
ated with firm’s market value.
Our study contributes to the literature on the determinants of cash hold-
ings and the role of corporate governance in firms’ cash holdings (see for
instance, Nikolov and Whited, 2014; Liu et al., 2014; Iskander-Datta and
Jia, 2012; Kusnadi and Wei, 2011; Harford et al., 2008; Kalcheva and Lins,
2007; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Dittmar et al., 2003;
Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009; Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; Han and
Qiu, 2007). It brings a different perspective than other studies which assume
that cash holdings reflect choices taken by relatively powerful managers.5 In
our sample, we find share ownership achieves a degree of concentration where
it is likely that managers are effectively monitored. In addition, managerial
shareholding is quasi-inexistent and if managers are shareholders typically
they are part of voting coalitions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops
our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 is devoted to our
estimation methodology. In Section 5 we present our main results. Section
6 explores extensions. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Hypotheses
In this section, we develop more explicitly our argument of why, in a
control-oriented financial system, firms facing agency problems may establish
tight controls over management through concentrated ownership and why
this creates a strong precautionary motive for holding greater amounts of
cash than would be the case in the absence of agency problems. This is the
consequence of inside shareholders assigning a high control premium to equity
implying that issuing outside equity is particularly costly. Then under an
optimal dividend and cash retention policy in the face of costly outside equity
issuance and costly bankruptcy, the firm will seek to maintain a relatively
large cash buffer. This has been demonstrated by Anderson and Carverhill
5It differs for instance from Kalcheva and Lins (2007) who also have Belgium in their
cross-country study, but who focus on the effect of managerial ownership on cash holdings.
4
(2012) using an infinite horizon model. A value-maximizing firm follows an
optimal dynamic dividend policy that aims at holding a cash buffer at a
state dependent target level. They retain earnings when cash holdings fall
short of the target, and they pay out any excess of earnings beyond what is
needed to maintain cash at the targeted amount. When earnings fall short
of contracted interest payments they finance debt service following a pecking
order rule: first draw down cash, second issue more debt if the firm is below
debt capacity and third issue outside equity. All else equal the targeted
amount of cash will be higher, the higher is the cost of external finance.6
In applying this analysis to the case of control-oriented finance as in
Belgium, we note that the costs of share issuance will be relatively high in
firms whose incumbent shareholders place a high value on control. This is
because issuing shares to service debt when there is a shortfall of cash flows
will imply a dissipation of control rights. Therefore, such firms target higher
levels of cash. This amount of cash holding is higher than would be optimal
in the absence of agency problems. However, it is second-best optimal. That
is, in the face of agency problems it gives the owner a higher value than if he
held a lower amount of cash.
Note that this precautionary motive for holding cash holds for value
maximizing shareholders. The precautionary motive would be reinforced if
shareholders were risk averse. This well may be the case when concentrated
ownership is achieved at the cost of under-diversification of the controlling
shareholders’ wealth. Concentrated ownership does not necessarily imply
risk aversion. For example, a large, diversified private equity fund may own
a controlling block of shares. However this has not been a common mode
of ownership in Belgium. In part this is for historical reasons. Many of the
largest Belgian firms trace their origins to the industrial development in Bel-
gium during the late 19th Century and in many cases they are still family
firms in the sense that the owners have links to the founding owner. Further-
more, this structure has been protected against change by various take-over
protections that have been in place from time to time.7 And this has not
6For a discussion of other theoretical frameworks that give rise to a precautionary
motive for cash, see Kimball (1992).
7For instance, this applies in the case of a large controlling shareholder who owns a
mono-holding company with the only purpose of controlling the listed firm. A concrete
example is the firm Solvay which is held by the founding families Solvay and Janssen, and
the mono-holding Solvac. Solvac is listed but it has registered shares that can only be
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been dissipated over the years through inheritance by successive generations
of heirs because there has been an effective coordinating mechanism through
voting alliances which are both explicit and legal.
Now what are the empirical implications of this analysis that we can test
using data on Belgian firms?
Hypothesis 1. We should expect to find a positive association between share
concentration and cash holdings.
Firms facing relatively high agency costs tend to acquire more control
rights in order to better monitor management. They would assign a higher
control premium to the shares implying a higher cost of external finance and
higher targeted and realized cash holdings.
In control-oriented corporate systems with limited access to external fi-
nancing cash holdings provide a cushion to face key financing decisions as
well as a means to be able to face possible hostile takeovers. The importance
of control is discussed in Holme´n et al. (2007) for Swedish firms. Most no-
tably, they find that less diversified controlling institutional shareholders are
significantly less likely to have their firms taken over, and they show that
these shareholders are primarily concerned with control and not diversifica-
tion. Thus the precautionary motive for shareholders is strongly related to
the eventuality of the loss of control over the firm. In Belgium, it is not
uncommon that large controlling shareholders reach the point to delist their
firms from the stock market with no other obvious reason than the fear of los-
ing the control. This was the case, for instance, with the firm BMT where the
controlling family Seynaeve decided to delist it in 2004.8 The beer company
Duvel Moortgat had the same fate, its controlling family decided to delist it
held by private investors. Solvac signed an agreement with Sofina S.A., Deutsche Bank
AG, and Generale de Banque S.A. to impede any hostile takeover bids for Solvay. Sofina
S.A. on the other hand is controlled by the families Boel, Solvay, and Janssen (Becht
and Mayer, 2001). The three families are linked by marriages (Verduyn, 2013). Another
example is the use of foundations incorporated in The Netherlands and known in Dutch
as the Stichting AdministratieKantoor. They are used as an effective anti-takeover defense
(see e.g., The Wall Street Journal Cohen, 2006; Raice and Patrick, 2015).
8The family Seynaeve controlled BMT with almost 40% of shares via her privately
owned company and which is incorporated in the Netherlands. In 2003 the family formed
a voting block with the other shareholders in the firm making the share ownership of this
voting coalition to reach almost 51%.
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and pay 120 billion Euros in cash for it (Vandendooren, 2012).9 In effect, the
insiders value their shares more highly than do the outside investors without
the same interest in control.
Hypothesis 2. We should expect to find zero association between managerial
shareholdings and cash holdings.
If ownership concentration effectively establishes shareholder control over
management, it can prevent asset substitution of liquid assets and keep the
choice of cash holding under shareholder control. The owners of the firm
may reward managers with shares, e.g., to incentivise higher effort. However
doing so would not affect the choice of liquid asset holdings.
Hypothesis 3. We should expect to find a positive association between cash
holding and firm value in family firms.
A successful entrepreneurial firm may generate more growth opportuni-
ties than it can finance through retentions or debt. Thus at some point it
may be faced with the choice of either grow with outside equity and even-
tually face loss of control or grow more slowly but retain control. Often
these problems become particularly telling as the firm matures and the ques-
tion of succession arises. Franks et al. (2012) provide evidence suggesting
that within-family succession of CEOs is prevalent among continental Eu-
ropean family-firms as compared to the UK where non-family succession is
more frequent. Sraer and Thesmar (2007) document the fact that in France
family-firms tend to be smaller than non-family-firms after controlling for
age of firm and other factors. Also using French data, Bach (2009) links the
growth of firms to succession choices and finds that firms favoring within-
family succession tend to grow more slowly than do firms favoring non-family
succession. Consequently, many established family firms may be operating
at close to their debt capacity. If that is the case, the analysis of Anderson
and Carverhill (2012) shows that good performance and therefore increases
in firm value are associated with increases in cash holdings.
9The family Moortgat held the company via its foundation (a Stichting Adminis-
tratieKantoor) which is incorporated in the Netherlands. In 2006 the family owned 64.13%
of shares via her foundation, one cousin and board member owned 10.13%, other family
members held 0.76%, and the company itself had an auto-control of 0.65%. All these
shareholders were in the same voting block making the percentage of share ownership,
altogether, almost 76%.
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3. Data
3.1. Governance data
We carefully construct a cleaned ownership data set which we collect for
our sample period from 1991 to 2006 from the printed annual reports of listed
firms. We supplement this with notifications from the Documentation and
Statistics Department of the Brussels Stock Exchange collected in confor-
mity with the 1989 law on ownership disclosure. We also use the annual
publication from ING bank (Banque Bruxelles Lambert, previously) on the
ownership positions of Belgian listed firms, when available. The resulting
database better suits our research than do the already existing ones, namely,
BDPart, available in the Documentation and Statistics Department of Brus-
sels Stock Exchange, and the Financial Reports of Belgian firms from the
National Bank of Belgium (NBB, henceforth). Specifically in the former,
every time there is a change in the ownership composition, the previous data
is overwritten, so it has no historical memory. In the latter, only Belgian
shareholders are reported with no indication given about foreign sharehold-
ers. Furthermore, a comparison of the printed annual reports and the NBB
data revealed frequent discrepancies in ownership information. It is worth
noting that starting from 1997 ownership positions of listed firms are re-
ported in the database “Belfirst” from Bureau Van Dijk. However, we found
several mistakes in the data reported by this source. This database cannot
be used as it is and needs an almost manual clean up.
The year 1991 is our starting period because from that date all firms
were required to report ownership information including all holdings greater
than 5% (or 3% if the firm writes this into its statutes).10 Under this law all
reporting shareholders are also required to report whether or not they par-
ticipate in a shareholder voting alliance and to identify the make-up of that
alliance. Shares may be held by individuals or by firms. In the latter case,
the reporting firm is required to indicate whether they belong to a business
group, which under Belgian law is a collection of firms that is consolidated
for the purposes of taxation. Our data ends in 2006 because after this year
there were major changes in the disclosure law which might interfere with
10The Belgian disclosure law was adopted in 1989, but for the years 1989 and 1990,
some of the firms enjoyed a “grace period”, where the shareholders of these firms were not
obliged to notify the Banking Commission, but by the end of 1991 ownership disclosure
was mandatory for all firms.
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the effects we want to study in the current paper.
3.1.1. Controlling shareholder
Based on the reports of the different share-ownership and to identify the
largest controlling shareholder we aggregate shareholding within the same
voting alliance or within the same business group. Then we calculate the size
and type of the largest block of shares for each firm in each year. There are
three possible types of largest controlling shareholders: (1) business groups
which are based on shareholdings only of firms within the same business
group, (2) voting alliances which are based on shareholdings of firms, busi-
ness groups and individuals who belong to the same voting alliance, and (3)
independent stakes which could be firms or individuals who belong neither
to business groups or voting alliances.
From Table 1 we see that the level of ownership concentration in Belgian
listed firms is very high. On average the largest shareholders hold 54% of
equities. In three quarters of the observations the level of concentration is
40% or more.
3.1.2. Shareholder diversification
As discussed above, the precautionary incentive to hold cash in the firm
may be reinforced by shareholder risk aversion if the controlling shareholder’s
wealth is highly concentrated in the firm. In order to provide evidence of
under-diversification of largest shareholders in Belgian listed firms we follow
Faccio et al. (2011) in using information provided in regulatory filings to de-
termine the number of declared holdings of the controlling block holders. In
our implementation of this, in addition to the above data sources, we use var-
ious other sources and undertake a detailed examination of the composition
of the contolling shareholders’ portfolios.11 With the information gathered
we construct a dummy variable indicating whether a shareholder is under
diversified or not. Our classification indicates that out of 1648 firm/year
observations 1218 are firms where the controlling shareholder appears to
have one share ownership which is the listed firm. On the other hand, 430
11We use various data sources including the depository of the annual accounts of Belgian
firms at the National Bank of Belgium database known as the “Centrale des Bilans”,
Bureau Van Dijk databases: Belfirst and Amadeus, data on families wealth from Verduyn
(2013) as well several press articles from the online archives of the Belgian financial press
like Trends-Tendances.
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firm/year observations are diversified controlling shareholders who have more
than one stock in their portfolios. Further explanation on data collection and
variable construction are in Appendix A. However, we should point out that
a limitation of any measurement of under-diversification based on declared
ownership is that the controlling block may itself be a legal entity which itself
is held by a number of persons and that we are not able to directly observe
these owners’ personal portfolios.12
3.1.3. Family firms
Our starting point for identifying family-firms are the shareholder reports
in accordance with the law of 1989 on ownership disclosure. In the declaration
of control to the Banking Commission it is said clearly that the shareholder is
a family group. We supplement this with information on ultimate ownership
of stakes held by firms to determine cases of control by a family-firm indirectly
through a pyramid.13 In this latter case we determine whether there is a
known link to the family of the founding owner(s). This is close to Sraer
and Thesmar (2007) who define a family-firm as one where the founder or
the heir is in control. This procedures differs from that of Faccio and Lang
(2002) who assume that an ownership block held by an unlisted company
represents de facto a family.14
3.1.4. Managerial ownership
We compute managerial share holding as the total reported shares owned
by the member of the board of directors including the chairman, the man-
aging director and the administrative director. In some cases it is observed
that all members of the board are associated with a voting alliance. In all
such cases all reporting managers are members of the same voting alliance.
For these cases managerial share holding is the total shares in that alliance.
12Ideally, we would like to observe the composition of the portfolios of the members in
the controlling shareholder blocks, along the lines of the study by Mueller (2008). Such
data are rarely obtainable generally and are not available in the case of Belgian firms.
13The disclosure law applies directly to the owners of the voting rights, as well as to those
investors who control voting rights indirectly via a pyramidal structure of intermediate
companies. Hence, when it is a family who is on the top of the pyramid this is indicated
in the declaration of control.
14More details on family-firm data and comparison with Faccio and Lang (2002) proce-
dure of classifying firms are in the Appendix.
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Remarkably, in 1409 cases (86% of all observations) there is no report-
ing manager (see Table 2, Panels A and B). Thus the level of managerial
shareholding is low as compared to the high degree of reported ownership
concentration. It turns out that in the Belgian context large managerial
share holdings are almost always associated with family-firms. The median
share ownership of a reporting manager in family-firms is of 64%, while in
non-family-firms the median of share ownership of a reporting manager is of
41% (Table 2, Panel A).
3.2. Firm level accounting data
Our sample consists of all active Belgian listed firms except those in
the banking, insurance and real estate sectors. During the sample period
there were some listed firms in liquidation which we exclude. This selection
process leaves us with a sample of 1648 annual observations of 196 firms
for the period 1991 to 2006. Accounting variables, from 1991 to 1996, are
from the year-end annual accounts of firms available from the database called
“Centrale des Bilans” edited by the NBB. Then from 1997 to 2006 we use
the database called “Belfirst” available from Bureau Van Dijk. From these
sources we construct our dependent variable cash holdings and the rest of
our explanatory variables: total debt, investment in financial fixed assets,
R&D expenditures, working capital, cash flow, capital expenditures, firms’
size which we construct by using total assets, and firms’ age. To construct
our proxy for the market valuation of the firm we use market-to-book value.
We obtain year-end market value from the Brussels Stock Exchange. We
also use daily stock prices data from Datastream to compte the standard
deviation of stock returns as a measure of firm’s risk.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. One thing to
note is the median leverage (ratio of total debt to total assets) in our sample
is 36%. This is higher than the median leverage for any country reported in
Table 2 of Rajan’ and Zingales’ international comparison of leverage in listed
firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). It is consistent with our argument that
Belgian firms have tended to grow using debt rather than outside equity.
4. Estimation methodology
We use a panel data model to explore the relation between different mea-
sures of ownership and cash holdings by firms. We report the results of
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the OLS, fixed effects, and random effects models. In most of our specifi-
cations, the Hausman tests favor the fixed effects model over the random
effects one. Using firm fixed effects helps controlling for the possible effect
of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at firm-level.
Our main specification testing the effect of large controlling shareholders
on cash holdings is the following:
Cashit =θ0 + θ1Largest Shareholderit + θ2Ageit + θ3Sizeit + θ4Total debtit
+θ5Financial fixed assetsit + θ6Capital expendituresit + θ7Working capitalit
+θ8Cash flowit + θ9R&Dit + δi + εit,
(1)
where, for firm i and year t Cashit stands for cash in hand and at bank,
and marketable securities scaled by total assets, Largest Shareholderit is the
percentage of the shareholdings of the largest shareholder in the firm either
she/he is an individual or a voting block, Ageit is firm’s age expressed in log,
Sizeit is measured by the log of total assets, Total debtit is the sum of short-
term and long-term debt scaled by total assets, Financial fixed assetsit is the
ratio of shareholdings of the firm in tied firms and firms with which there
exists a participation link scaled by total assets15, Capital expendituresit are
new acquisitions of tangible assets scaled by total assets, Working capitalit
is computed net of cash and is scaled by total assets, Cash flowit is earnings
before interest and taxes scaled by total assets, R&Dit are expenses in R&D
scaled by total assets, δi is a firm effect (which is either fixed, random, or
omitted depending upon whether the estimation method is FE, RE or OLS),
and εit is a residual.
In Equation 1 we make no distinction between large controlling sharehold-
ers. They could be one entity, for instance one firm or one person, as well as
a voting block which is a collection of shareholders. With this equation we
test our Hypothesis 1. To explore more in depth the type of shareholders,
for instance whether being in voting block has an impact on cash holdings,
15The firms tied to another firm are: the firms that control it, the firms that it controls,
the firms with which it forms a consortium, the other firms that, to the knowledge of the
board, are controlled by one of the firms mentioned above. The firms with which there
exists a participation link are the firms, other than tied firms, in which the firm or its
subsidiary holds a direct or indirect participation.
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we augment the above equation with a dummy variable which takes on the
value of one if the largest shareholder is a collection of several shareholders
organized in a voting coalition and zero otherwise. We also add an interacted
term between largest shareholder variable and voting block dummy.
We consider a variation on Equation 1 by including a dummy variables
for managerial ownership. This allows us to test Hypothesis 2. In a similar
manner we also explore the effect of the presence of large shareholders, voting
blocks, or families.
To study the relationship between cash holding and firm value we use the
following basic specification.
Tobin’s Qit =θ0 + θ1Cashit + θ2Largest Shareholderit + θ3Ageit + θ4Sizeit
+θ5Total debtit + θ6Financial fixed assetsit + θ7Capital expendituresit
+θ8R&Dit + δi + εit,
(2)
where, for firm i and year t Tobin’s Qit is computed as market-to-book value
and is our proxy for market firm’s value, Cashit stands for cash in hand and at
bank, and marketable securities scaled by total assets, Largest Shareholderit
is the percentage of the direct shareholdings of the largest shareholder in the
firm either she/he is an individual or a voting block, Ageit is firm’s age ex-
pressed in log, Sizeit is measured by the log of total assets, Total debtit is the
sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by total assets, Financial fixed
assetsit is the ratio of shareholdings of the firm in tied firms and firms
with which there exists a participation link scaled by total assets, Capital
expendituresit are new acquisitions of tangible assets scaled by total assets,
R&Dit are expenses in R&D, scaled by total assets, δi is a firm fixed effect,
and εit is a residual. In a particular version of this model we explore whether
the relation between firm value and cash holding differs for family firms as
compared to non-family firms. To do so we augment the specification using a
dummy variable Family interacted with the variable Cash. Our hypothesis 3
is tested as the prediction of a positive partial correlation between firm value
and this interaction of Cash and Family. We also include different interacted
terms between Cash, Largest Shareholder, and Voting blocks.
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5. Results
5.1. Preliminary analysis
Table 2 summarizes mean and median of liquid assets and share concen-
tration for our sample in three two-way classifications. In Panel A we classify
firms as family-firms versus non-family ones and as firms with share-owning
managers versus without share-owning managers. In Panel B the classifica-
tion is based on firms with voting blocks versus firms without voting blocks
and on with share-owning managers versus without share-owning managers.
In Panel C, we group based on family ownership status and presence or not
of voting blocks.
The first striking observation from Table 2 is the very high level of own-
ership concentration. In almost every category of firm (family versus non-
family, with voting block versus without voting block) the mean controlling
shareholding exceeds 50% of the shares. The exception is when there is a
reporting manager, in which case the controlling shareholder typically holds
about 47% of the share, still a very concentrated holding. Second, we observe
that significant managerial share ownership is the exception rather than the
rule. There are reporting managers in only 239 out of 1648 observations
overall. When we analyze the different types of classifications in Table 2 we
notice that family-firms come first in terms of ownership concentration when
shareholders are organized in voting blocks. Their ownership is as high as 61
percent against 51 percent in the absence of voting blocks (Panel C). Note
that family-firms represent one third of our sample.
Panels A or B show no significant difference in cash holdings in the pres-
ence of a reporting manager or not. This is preliminary evidence that does
not support the view that powerful managers use their prerogatives to push
firms towards holding more liquid assets.
5.2. Cash holdings and governance
We test our different hypotheses using panel data models. We report our
results for OLS, fixed effects and random effects models. However, we limit
our comments to the results of fixed effects specifications since the Hausman
tests favor them.
Table 3 reports our results for the baseline cash holding regressions. Our
first major result is that Largest shareholder enters with a positive and sig-
nificant coefficient in all the specifications. This supports our Hypothesis 1
that increased shareholder control obtained through concentrated ownership
14
is associated with higher level of cash holding. The presence or not of voting
blocks does not alter the effect of concentration on cash holding. However,
we find for family firms, with or without voting blocks, the effect of increased
concentration (i.e., higher share in the controlling) block has not significant
effect on cash holding.
The rest of control variables we include in the estimations are in line with
previous literature. Total debt and Working capital are negatively related to
the cash held by firms which is consistent with the argument that they play
the role of substitutes for cash. For instance, studies like Opler et al. (1999),
Kim et al. (1998), or Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) find a negative relationship
between leverage and liquid asset holdings. Also, Opler et al. (1999) argue
that firms use factoring and securitization as a means of raising liquidity.
Accordingly, firms with high working capital are expected to hold less cash.
Our results also show that firms with more investment in financial fixed as-
sets hold less cash. This finding is consistent with Opler et al. (1999), who
use the number of reported lines of business segments to measure whether
firms have non-core assets that could be liquidated in periods of economic
distress. More generally, industrial cross-shareholding may indicate the exis-
tence of an internal capital market that operates among related firms. This
seems to be the case with our variable Financial fixed assets which represents
the amounts invested by the firms in tied firms and firms with which there
exists a participation link. Like in Opler et al. (1999), we find that firms
with more cash flows hold more cash. This is consistent with the view that
firms with high cash flow will accumulate a larger cash buffer, in line with the
results of Anderson and Carverhill (2012) for firms approaching debt capac-
ity. Regarding Capital expenditures, whereas firms may hold financial slack
in anticipation of investment opportunities, they draw down these resources
at the time the investments are made. As expected we find a negative as-
sociation between cash and new investments; however, it is not statistically
significant. We find no significant effect of R&D, age or size on cash holdings.
In Table 4, we turn our attention to managerial ownership and its ef-
fect on cash holdings. The introduction of the dummy variable Manager
has essentially no effect on the cash holding regression results. Manager is
insignificant, and this variable interacted with Largest shareholder is also
insignificant. At the same time, the variable Largest shareholder continues
to enter positively and is significant. This supports the Hypothesis 2 and
undermines the interpretation of cash holding in systems with weak investor
protections as a manifestation of managerial rent extraction. These remarks
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hold as well when we allow for family firm effects (Columns 4-6) or voting
alliance effects (Columns 7-9).
Finally we turn to the relation of firm value and cash holding. Table 5
presents the results of the estimations of the effect of Cash on Tobin’s Q.
In Columns 1-3 we find a significant positive relationship of Cash and firm
value. This carries over to the fixed effect results reported in Column 8 where
we have included family and voting alliance effects. Largest shareholder enter
positively and is significant, and the interaction term between Family and
Cash is positive and highly significant.
The effects of the other control variables are in line with previous liter-
ature studying different effects on firm value. We conclude that our results
support our Hypothesis 3.
6. Extensions
6.1. Shareholder diversification and risk aversion
In this section we consider a variety of extensions of our basic cash holding
regressions. First, we explore whether controlling shareholder risk aversion
might account for our findings. As already argued above a value maximiz-
ing controlling shareholder will have a precautionary motive for holding cash
when outside equity finance is seen as very costly. This would be reinforced if
controlling shareholders are risk averse and have established their controlling
block only at the cost of having wealth heavily concentrated in the firm’s
shares. In principle, the effect of risk aversion could be relatively more im-
portant quantitatively than the effect of control premia assigned to outside
equity.
To explore this idea we have developed an approach along the lines of
Faccio et al. (2011) who develop a meaure of under-diversification based
on numbers of holdings that surpass a declaration threshold. Specifically
as discussed in Section 3.1.2 we used available information on ownership
declarations to construct an indicator variable for firms whose controlling
block holder is under-diversified. At the same time we also introduce a
control variable for level of firm risk-taking. Specifically we use the estimated
volatility of the firm’s stock returns. As stock returns are not available for
all firms in our data set, we are able to construct this variable only for a
sub-sample.
The results are presented in Table 6. In columns 1-3 we present the result
for the full sample, omitting the control for stock return volatility. In the
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OLS regression the interaction between Largest shareholder and the Non-
Diversified dummy is insignificant while Largest shareholder is positive and
significant, as in in our benchmark results of Table 3. In the Fixed Effect
and Random Effect results the opposite is true. We interpret this is some
supporting evidence that controlling shareholder risk aversion may account
for the observed levels of cash holding. We estimate the same model in the
reduced sample in Columns 4-6, and the model with a control for share return
volatility included in Columns 7-9. The results are qualitatively the same.
So it appears there is some robust evidence in favour of the risk aversion
hypothesis. However, we caution against pushing that interpretation too
far because in our case (as in almost all other applications) the data do
not allow us to observe the degree of diversification on the comprehensive
personal portfolios of shareholders.
6.2. Is there a tax based explanation for cash holdings in Belgian firms?
Foley et al. (2007) show that tax reasons play a prominent role in holding
cash by multinational US firms and their affiliates. More specifically, they
show that affiliates in countries with low tax rates hold more cash than other
affiliates of the same firm.
We investigate tax motives in holding cash by looking at firms related
to coordination centers.16 Coordination centers were created in Belgium in
1982, in order to give incentives, mainly very attractive tax incentives, to
multinational groups to relocate their financial operations in Belgium and to
favor employment. Coordination centers allow multinational groups to carry
out a large variety of financial and managerial services on a roughly tax-free
basis. To investigate the effect of coordination centers on cash holdings we
introduce an interaction variable between a dummy variable, Coordination
Center, which takes on a value of one if the firm is associated with a coordi-
nation center and zero otherwise and Largest shareholder. We rerun the full
model. The results are in Table 7 Columns (2). The interacted variable Co-
ordination Center* Largest shareholder it is not statistically significant in the
fixed effects model. From these results we cannot conclude that coordination
centers have an impact on cash holdings.
16Since 2008 these centers are officially prohibited by law (some continue until 31 De-
cember 2010 under certain conditions), but they were in effect during our sample period
and they played an active role.
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6.3. The second largest shareholder block
In principle, the effective control of a large shareholder may be diminished
by the presence of other large shareholders. To explore this, we calculate the
share holding of a second large shareholder. If the second shareholder has
any impact, we expect either a negative relationship between cash holdings
and share holding of the second shareholder or a smaller coefficient on the
variable relative to the first largest one. However, as has been argued by
Zwiebel (1995) it may be that large investors “create their own space,” i.e.,
by holding large blocks they deter other block investors from locating in the
same firm. It appears that something like this operates in Belgium. In our
sample firms’ ownership is highly concentrated, and in almost all cases where
there is a second largest declared shareholder she/he is very small.
Out of 1648 observations (from 1991 to 2006) almost half of the observa-
tions (807) have no declared second shareholder. When there exists a second
shareholder in the firm its share ownership is very small compared to the
first one as we can observe from Table 1. On average a second shareholder
holds about 5% of equities while the leading one has 54%.
The variable Second shareholder is calculated as the size of the second
largest reported block of shares, taking into account institutional ownership
and voting alliances. The results of the full model augmented by this vari-
able are reported in Columns (5), of Table 7. The estimated coefficient is
never significant. Thus there is no evidence of any effect of the presence of
a second block. The coefficient estimates of other variables in the model are
not affected by the inclusion of Second shareholder. We also tried a specifi-
cation where we use a dummy variable for the second shareholder instead of
percentage of shares. The results are not significant.
7. Concluding remarks
In this paper we study the case of a strongly control-oriented financial
system to see what effect the share ownership and governance structures have
on firms’ decisions to hold liquid assets. We find evidence of a positive asso-
ciation between ownership concentration and the level of liquid asset holding.
In addition we find that firms’ market valuation is positively associated with
cash held by firms. These results are evidence that liquid asset holding is
influenced by a precautionary motive on the part of the controlling share-
holders. This may be due to a high control premium which makes outside
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equity issuance very costly for insiders. And this may be reinforced by insid-
ers’ risk aversion if they are unable to diversify their personal wealth while
maintaining control of the firm.
Previous observations of relatively high cash holdings in the face of poor
investor protections have generally been viewed as evidence of managerial
rent extraction (for instance, Dittmar et al., 2003; Pinkowitz et al., 2006;
Kalcheva and Lins, 2007). Our analysis raises significant doubts about this
interpretation in the context of a control-oriented financial system such as
the Belgian system we study. Indeed, our results indicate that in spite of
relatively weak investor protections, there exist large shareholders who have
the ability and the incentives to control manager (see eg., La Porta et al.,
1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). Significant shareholding by managers
is the exception rather than the rule. When there are managers with signif-
icant stakes in the firm, we find this has no effect on cash holding. Hence
our results confirm our hypothesis that in a corporate system like in Belgium
managers are monitored by large controlling shareholders and as such there
is no association between managerial ownership and the amount of cash held
by the firm. There is no evidence that high liquid asset holding are due
to independent managers keeping assets in liquid form that allows them to
extract rents.
We do find evidence that liquid asset holding motivated by a precaution-
ary motive is mitigated somewhat by the operation of an internal capital
market as manifested most notably by cross share holdings among a group
of firms.
We further investigate the effect for firms of being related to coordination
centers on cash holdings. Firms are linked to these centers mainly for taxes
reasons. However, our results indicate no significant effect on holding of
liquid assets. There is also no significant effect of a second shareholder on
the cash held by firms.
While the ownership structures found in the Belgian case that we have
studied in detail contrast strongly with those found in the largest US and
UK firms, many of these features are present in other countries of continental
Europe and elsewhere. Our results suggest that effective control is often
obtained through high ownership concentration. This suffices to constrain
managers, but its by-product is a relatively high precautionary motive to
hold cash because insiders assign a high control premium to equity or risk
aversion or both.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Q1 Median Q3
Liquid assets 1648 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.13
Largest shareholder 1648 0.54 0.40 0.54 0.70
Manager’s shares 1648 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Second shareholder 1648 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.08
Age (in years) 1648 55 23 64 79
Size 1648 18.78 17.47 18.51 20.08
Leverage 1648 0.38 0.16 0.36 0.55
Financial fixed assets 1648 0.49 0.22 0.52 0.73
Capital expenditure 1648 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02
Working capital 1648 0.16 0.01 0.06 0.25
Cash flow 1648 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.08
R&D expenditure 1648 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Market-to-book value 1648 1.17 0.54 0.90 1.44
Firm risk 1078 0.03 0.017 0.02 0.03
Liquid assets is cash in hand and at bank, and marketable securities divided
by total assets. Largest shareholder variable is the percentage of the share-
holdings of the largest shareholder in the firm either he is an individual or a
voting coalition. Manager’s shares is the percentage of the reported share-
holdings of a company’s managers regardless of his rank in the board. Second
shareholder is the percentage of the shareholdings of the second shareholder
in the firm. Age is the age of the firm in number of years. Size is measured by
the log of total assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debt,
divided by total assets. Financial fixed assets is the ratio of shareholdings of
the firm in tied firms and firms with which there exists a participation link
divided by total assets. Capital expenditure are new acquisitions of tangible
assets, divided by total assets. Working capital is computed net of cash and
is divided by total assets. Cash flow is earnings before interest and taxes
divided by total assets. R&D expenditure are expenses in R&D, divided by
total assets. Market-to-book value is the market capitalisation of the firm
divided by total assets. Firm risk is the standard deviation of the stock
returns of firms.
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Table 7: The effect of coordination centers and the second shareholder on cash holdings
OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Largest shareholder 0.031** 0.032 0.046** 0.029** 0.051** 0.043**
(0.014) (0.026) (0.020) (0.014) (0.023) (0.020)
Coordination Center*Largest Shareholder -0.013 0.038 -0.008
(0.011) (0.043) (0.026)
Second shareholder 0.005 0.020 -0.002
(0.040) (0.050) (0.046)
Age -0.001 0.022 -0.003 -0.001 0.021 -0.003
(0.003) (0.014) (0.007) (0.003) (0.014) (0.007)
Size -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Total debt -0.089*** -0.025 -0.043*** -0.090*** -0.023 -0.043***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014)
Financial fixed assets -0.293*** -0.246*** -0.264*** -0.296*** -0.246*** -0.264***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Capital expenditures -0.229*** -0.046 -0.072 -0.230*** -0.044 -0.073
(0.084) (0.048) (0.047) (0.084) (0.048) (0.047)
Working capital -0.208*** -0.250*** -0.251*** -0.209*** -0.251*** -0.251***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.025)
Cash flow 0.037* 0.041*** 0.036** 0.037* 0.041*** 0.035**
(0.022) (0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.015) (0.014)
R&D 0.352** -0.146 0.177 0.344** -0.134 0.175
(0.143) (0.429) (0.241) (0.144) (0.430) (0.241)
Constant 0.349*** 0.209** 0.329*** 0.365*** 0.212** 0.334***
(0.048) (0.085) (0.062) (0.042) (0.085) (0.061)
Observations 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648 1648
R2 0.335 0.158 0.335 0.157
Hausman test 0.0000 0.0000
This Table presents the estimations of the effects of coordination centers in Columns (1) to (3) and the second shareholder
in Columns (4) to (9) on cash holdings. Largest shareholder is the percentage of shareholding of the largest controlling
shareholder in the firm. Coordination center is a dummy variable taking into account the fact that a firm is related to
these centers or not. Second shareholder is the percentage of shareholding of the second shareholder in the firm. Age is
firm age expressed in log. Size is measured by the log of total assets. Total debt is the sum of short-term and long-term
debt, divided by total assets. Financial fixed assets is the ratio of shareholdings of the firm in tied firms and firms with
which there exists a participation link divided by total assets. Capital expenditures are new acquisitions of tangible assets,
divided by total assets. Working capital is computed net of cash and is divided by total assets. Cash flow is earnings
before interest and taxes divided by total assets. R&D are expenses in R&D, divided by total assets. Robust standard
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix A. Diversification of the largest controlling shareholders
Appendix A.1. Data sources
We collect data on the composition of portfolios of the largest sharehold-
ers from several sources depending on their type and nationality.17 Indeed,
the largest shareholder could be a Belgian firm, a non-Belgian firm, or a phys-
ical person. When the largest shareholder is a Belgian firm, we use two data
sources. For the period from 1991 to 1996, we use the depository of the an-
nual accounts of all Belgian firms at the National Bank of Belgium database
known as the “Centrale des Bilans”. In addition to annual accounts, this
database also contains the participations/subsidiaries of firms. Then for the
period from 1997 to 2006, we use the Belfirst database from Bureau Van
Dijk which contains amongst other data the participations/subsidiaries of
Belgian firms.18 When the largest shareholders are European firms we use
Bureau Van Dijk’s Amadeus database. It turns out that the largest share-
holders are foreign shareholders in only 28 percent of firm/year observations.
Amongst these foreign largest shareholders 23 percent are from the neighbor-
ing countries namely, The Netherlands, France, and Luxembourg. When the
largest shareholders are physical persons19, there is no systematic and ready
database to use. In that case we gather information from several sources.
One of these sources is a book written by the Belgian journalist Verduyn
(2013). He presents the wealthiest Belgian families in the format of a hit-
parade based on their estimated wealth. The book is full of information
about different aspects of Belgian corporate system. It provides the history
of families, which generation of the family is in charge, the different relations
between the different families through marriages and alliances, how the busi-
nesses evolved and developed, the various changes the firms went through
like mergers, liquidations, listing and delisting from the stock exchange, in
addition to many other informative stories and anecdotes. The estimation of
families’ or individuals’ wealth presented is based on the professional wealth,
i.e., all the family belongings in terms of businesses.20 Another rich source
17If the largest shareholder is a voting block we investigate the portfolio composition of
the largest shareholder in that voting block.
18Data from Bureau Van Dijk starts in 1997.
19More than 9 percent of firm/year observations in our sample.
20This journalist also has a website, derijkstebelgen.be, which reports news and updates
on the evolution of families’ businesses and wealth.
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on families’ wealth and businesses are the Belgian financial press, such as
the magazine Trends-Tendances where many details about Belgian families,
their wealth, their firms, their investments, etc, are discussed weekly. Hence,
to establish whether the families and their members are diversified or not
we also consulted press articles mainly from the online archives of Trends-
Tendances magazine.21 In 2007 Trends-Tendances published a hit-parade of
the 100 wealthiest Belgian families in the fashion of Forbes Magazine. This
classification showed that the estimations made by Ludwig Verduyn or by
Trends-Tendances are accurate. Indeed, Forbes Magazine in its hit-parade
of the wealthiest personalities in the world included Albert Fre`re and his
estimated wealth which was similar to the earlier estimations provided by
Ludwig Verduyn and by Trends-Tendances. These data sources are very rich
and we are confident that they are accurate. Nonetheless, we should ac-
knowledge that it is likely that not every single item of the wealth of these
families and/or individuals is included in these estimations. They might, for
instance, also own expensive real estate, luxury cars, art, etc., but this will
remain by no means comparable to the wealth they invest in their firms.
Appendix A.2. Under-diversification variable
Using the information gathered from our different sources, we are able to
establish whether the largest shareholder has participation interests in other
firms than the listed firm in our sample, or not. This allows us to construct a
dummy variable for the under-diversification of the controlling shareholders.
We opt for a dummy variable instead of the number of participation interests
used in Faccio et al. (2011), because, unlike them we were not able to establish
the number of participation interests with certainty. Even the number of
participations has its limitations, as the authors acknowledge, since the use of
the number of participation interests as a proxy for diversification rests on the
assumption that the larger the number of firms an investor has in its portfolio,
the more likely it is that she is diversified. Thus, this measure does not
account for the weights of each investment in the portfolio and may overstate
(understate) the level of diversification (non-diversification). Nevertheless,
its advantage is that it allows measuring “portfolio diversification without
requiring any further information about the portfolio (such as the portfolio
structure or returns distribution)” (Faccio et al. (2011), page 3608).
21These online archives go back in time to the nineties.
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Appendix B. Family-firm data
Any analysis of firm behavior which distinguishes family-firms from non-
family-firms will be sensitive to precisely how firms are classified into these
groupings. One of the most ambitious attempts in this direction is the study
of the ownership of listed Western European corporations by Faccio and
Lang (2002) (F&L, henceforth). According to their methodology, a firm is
considered a family-firm if the controlling shareholder is identified as a family
(including an individual) or if it is an unlisted company. Recently Franks
et al. (2012) have undertaken a more detailed analysis of the largest firms,
both listed and private, in each of France, Germany, Italy and the UK. Unlike
F&L, their data allows them to trace the ultimate ownership of private as
well as listed companies through ownership chains involving both listed and
private companies. When they compare their data with the F&L data for
their four countries they find that out of the 1359 companies identified by
F&L as family owned 532 (or 39%) are not family-firms by the Franks et al.
(2012) methodology. In 380 (or 28%) of the cases there is an unambiguous
misclassification, generally as a result of F&L’s assumption that control by
a private firm implies family ownership. In the remaining 11% of cases there
is an ambiguous listing status or there is no information available to assign
ultimate ownership.
Many studies interested in investigating different aspects of family-firms
use F&L data. For instance, Kalcheva and Lins (2007) use F&L data to study
the managerial agency problem related to cash holdings for a cross-country
sample including Belgium which is the country of our current investigation.22
The Kalcheva and Lins (2007) measure of insider control is defined as the
“control rights held by the management group and its family.” Thus, if F&L
classify the firm as family controlled then Kalcheva and Lins (2007) assign
the associated shares as being held by management. This might result in a
misclassification for two reasons. Either it may be that the controlling block
is held by a private company which is not controlled by a family. Or even if
the controlling block is family controlled, it may be that no family member
is involved in the management of the firm.
Our sample is drawn from Belgian listed firms which presents an inter-
esting case in this context because under the law on shareholding disclosure
22Kalcheva and Lins (2007) cross-country sample also includes countries for which Franks
et al. (2012) report family-firm misclassifications by F&L.
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introduced in 1989, shareholders are required to declare whether they are
part of a voting alliance which could be a family group. Furthermore, many
Belgian firms are very old by international standards with origins that can
be traced to the 19th century. The matters of family succession and wealth
of Belgian dynasties are widely followed and commented upon in the Belgian
press. As a result, we can draw upon a variety of sources of supplementary
information when verifying the classification of firms into family-firms and
non-family-firms.
When we undertake the comparison of our data set with the classifica-
tions of F&L, in line with Franks et al. (2012) we find numerous cases of
misclassification by F&L. Specifically, there are 8 cases of firms considered
family-firms by F&L because they find the ultimate owner is a private com-
pany but where we find no such link to a family group. In 5 of these cases, the
firms are state-owned. Furthermore, there are 7 firms that F&L consider not
family controlled where we are able to confirm that they are in fact family
controlled. In addition to all these inconsistencies, the year of data selection
is not 1999, as claimed in their paper, but a mix of years between 1996 and
1999.
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